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Background: The Democratic Republic of Congo is actively experiencing its tenth outbreak of 
Ebola Virus Disease. This outbreak is the second-largest in history. This outbreak of Ebola virus 
is taking place in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in the eastern part of the country. The North 
Kivu and Ituri provinces are two of the most populous, conflict-torn, provinces in the DRC, and 
border three other countries, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan. This current outbreak has been 
marked by numerous attacks against health care services and the inability to bring this outbreak 
to a swift end like the outbreak in Équateur province DRC. 
 
Aim: The intent of this thesis is to quantify the frequency of attacks on health care using publicly 
available data in order to have a better understanding of how violent attacks towards health care 
are impacting the Ebola response efforts in North Kivu and Ituri provinces. 
 
Methods: This study is a cross-sectional examination of data collected from publicly available 
resources to characterize the violence towards the Ebola response teams. This study includes data 
from the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care published by the World Health 
Organization, data collected from local media outlets, social media, international organizations, 
universities, and non-profit organizations. 
 
Results: There were 102 attacks that were confirmed to have taken place in one of the two 
affected provinces. The peak of violence towards health care in the DRC occurred during May 
2019. Health care facilities were the most affected health care resource. Also, more attacks 
occurred in North Kivu province compared to Ituri Province. 
 
Conclusion: Our study, one of the first to demonstrate the prevalence and context of violent 
attacks related to health care resources and delivery during a health crisis, indicates the need for 
deliberate planning and preventative measures when mitigating an infectious disease outbreak 
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Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a hemorrhagic fever that commonly infects humans and non-
human primates. EVD is extremely fatal, with mortality rates ranging from 25 to 90%.1 EVD 
belongs to the Filoviridae family and the Ebolavirus genus. Among the Ebolavirus genus, there 
are five distinct species which are: Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV), Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV), Taï 
Forest ebolavirus (TEBOV), Reston ebolavirus (REBOV), and Bundibuyo ebolavirus (BEBOV). 
Only ZEBOV, SEBOV, and BEBOV have caused outbreaks in humans with ZEBOV having the 
highest fatality rates recorded in humans.2 EVD was discovered in 1976 two simultaneous 
outbreaks occurred in Sudan and Zaire (now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo). The 
two outbreaks of EVD was relatively close geographically, but the viruses were not 
epidemiologically linked and were later identified as two distinct species of virus, SEBOV and 
ZEBOV respectively.1 In the time since it was discovered in 1976, there have been 23 confirmed 
outbreaks of EVD, predominantly occurring in sub-Saharan Africa.1,2  
EVD is zoonotic with frequent spillovers into humans, non-human primates, and other 
animal populations. There is evidence to support the claim that the natural host for EVD is bats, 
particularly bats belonging to the Pteropodidae family; however, there has yet to be virus isolated 
from bats found in natural conditions.2 Humans are likely infected by coming into close contact 
with bats or other deceased animals such as chimpanzees or other wild game. After the initial 
spillover event, the disease can be spread by human-to-human transmission via bodily fluids. 
Caring for those who are sick or coming into close contact with dead bodies is associated with a 
high risk for disease transmission because of the likelihood of coming into direct contact with 
bodily fluids.2 Because bodily fluids are very infectious, the risk of nosocomial transmission is 
very high; therefore, it is essential that appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) be used 
when treating EVD patients. The incubation period is 2-21 days, and there are three phases of the 
disease. Phase one is defined by an acute non-specific viral illness where patients will experience 
symptoms such as malaise, fatigue, and body aches.2,3 During the second phase of the disease is 
dominated by gastrointestinal symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, at this stage 
many patients will become dehydrated.2,3  After the second week of illness, some patients will 
begin to recover; however some will begin to deteriorate among those who do not recover, 
patients will proceed to the third stage, which is shock possibly due to hypovolaemia and a 
systemic inflammatory response, some patients may also experience neurological manifestations 
10 
 
during this stage.2,3 At this point, some patients will begin to experience hemorrhage; however, 
during the 2013-2016 West Africa outbreak, this wasn’t common.2 Many other common diseases 
can have similar symptoms as EVD such as influenza, malaria, or typhoid fever.4  
On July 28, 2018 a notification was sent from the North Kivu Provincial Health division to 
the Ministry of Health in the Democratic Republic of Congo detailing a cluster of acute 
hemorrhagic fever cases.5  On August 1, 2018 the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale 
(INRB) in Kinshasa reported that of the six samples that were collected from the patients who 
were hospitalized Mabalako Health Zone in North Kivu, four tested positive for EVD.5 This 
marked the beginning of the 10th outbreak of EVD in the DRC since it’s discovery in 1976. The 
outbreak in the North Kivu Province was officially declared on August 1, 2018 one week after 
the 9th outbreak in the Équateur province was declared as ending.  
There are several reasons that the outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces is unique. One 
being that North Kivu province is one of the most populous provinces in the DRC with 8 million 
inhabitants and shares a border with not only four other provinces in the DRC (Ituri, South Kivu, 
Maniema, and Tshopo) but it also shares a border with Uganda and Rwanda.6 Second being that 
this outbreak is occurring in a conflict zone. The eastern region of the DRC has experienced 
sustained violence since the 1960s when the DRC gained its independence from Belgium. There 
were at least 40 armed groups active in the eastern DRC as of October 2013.7 Due to the 
prolonged and sustained violence there is an atmosphere of mistrust among communities of the 
Ebola response efforts.8 This mistrust and suspicion has fueled the violence in the region. Due to 
this violence there are an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons in the region and a 
continuous exodus of refugees to neighboring countries such as Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.6 
Third, not only is the region experiencing an EVD outbreak it has also co-currently been 
experiencing a cholera, monkeypox, and vaccine-derived polio virus type 2 outbreaks.9 
Purpose of the Study 
This Ebola outbreak in the eastern DRC is unique. It is the first time an EVD outbreak has 
occurred in an active conflict zone. In a study done by Masumbuko Claude Underschultz and 
Hawkes, researchers demonstrated the pervasiveness of resistance to the EVD response and the 
abundance of mistrust in the community.8 This resistance has taken many forms but notably has 
manifested in violence towards health care services and workers. The amount of attacks that 
have targeted health care resources in some capacity is alarming. Even though there is an 
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effective vaccine to prevent EVD infection, it has not been enough to end this outbreak. One of 
the significant contributors to the continuation of this outbreak is believed to be the attacks that 
target health care resources. The amount of violence towards the Ebola response seen in this 
outbreak was not seen in such extremes in the last Ebola outbreak in the Équateur province in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2018. In a study by Wells and colleagues, researchers 
demonstrated that if the ring vaccination strategy that was used to control the Ebola outbreak in 
the Équateur Province had been eroded or impeded in some way it would degrade the 
effectiveness of the vaccine campaign to control the spread of the disease.11   
To have a better understanding of how this violence has impacted the ability to contain this 
outbreak it is important to understand how often these attacks have happened, what resources are 
they affecting, and when these attacks reached their peak. The intent of this thesis is to quantify 
the frequency of attacks on health care sourced from publicly available data to have a better 
understanding of the dynamics of this EVD outbreak and the impact violence is having on the 
containment of this outbreak.  
Research Questions  
Characterization of the type and frequency of violent attacks towards health care in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo during the 2018-2020 Ebola outbreak will be achieved by 
answering the following questions: 
1. What was the prevalence of violent attacks against health care? 
2. Did the pattern and frequency of violence vary? 
3. What health care resources were targeted by these violent attacks? 
4. What organizations or persons were responsible for violent attacks? 
5. Did violent attacks impede response activities? 
Review of the Literature 
 This thesis will explore the dynamics of violence towards health care during outbreaks of 
infectious diseases. Specifically, the violence targeted towards health care during the Ebola 
outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2018-2020. The literature review presented 
here describes the current knowledge of the violence experienced in the region before the 
outbreak began, and violence towards health care during other outbreaks of infectious disease in 
countries facing similar challenges.  
Conflict in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces 
12 
 
 The eastern DRC has been embroiled in conflict since the DRC gained its independence 
from Belgium in the 1960s. When the Belgium colonial rule ended, they left the country with 
little social or economic development.10 Shortly after the country’s first national election in May 
1960, Joseph Mobutu, the country’s Chief of Staff of the Army, seized power in a military coup, 
he suspended the parliament and had the first democratically elected prime minister executued.10  
Mobutu officially took control of the country in 1965. Mobutu’s thirty-two-year long reign was 
defined by corruption and economic mismanagement; his reign would come to an end before the 
First Congo War.10 Prior to the First Congo War (1996-1997) there were long-standing ethnic 
and political tensions in the North Kivu and Ituri Region that led to other conflicts. One of the 
many ethnic conflicts that plagued the eastern region was the tensions between Rwandan 
immigrants (Hutu and Tutsi) and those who considered themselves indigenous .12 Many of these 
immigrants had been brought in by the Belgians to work and continued to live in the DRC after 
the Belgians left. Even though the Rwandan immigrants’ children were born in the DRC, they 
were perceived as outsiders by many. Also, because of the Rwandan Genocide many of 
Rwandan Tutsi refugees who were fleeing violence came to the DRC, and after the Hutu 
rebellion was squashed, many of the Hutu rebels also fled to the DRC. These tensions resulted in 
numerous conflicts and killings up to 1997.12 After the end of the First Congo War, Laurent 
Kabila took power, he led the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour las Liberation du Congo 
(AFDL) which was backed by Rwanda and Uganda.13  
 The Second Congo War began in 1998 and lasted until 2003. This conflict was described 
as Africa's first world war, and not only involved DRC based groups but was an international 
conflict involving neighboring countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Chad, Sudan, 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe.10,13 The fighting was rooted in ethnic and political conflicts and the 
desire to harness the regions valuable natural resources.10 During this conflict the eastern part of 
the country was controlled by the opposition forces and the west was controlled by the DRC 
government. With the country de facto partitioned Kabila partnered with ex-Rwandan forces and 
Congolese guerillas, the Mai-Mai.12 At this point the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition was beginning 
to falter and splinter into new groups. During the stalemate a humanitarian crisis was growing, 
and pressure began to build from outside influences, such as Libya and South Africa, to bring 
this war to an end. In 2002 a peace agreement was reached following the assassination of the 
county's leader Laurent Kabila and his son, Joseph Kabalia's assumption of power. The Second 
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Congo War officially ended in 2003. Throughout the First and Second Congo Wars the eastern 
Congo served as a battle ground for many of the fights during the war. Following the withdrawal 
of Ugandan and Rwandan forces after the peace agreement, new fighting started in Ituri 
province. There were more than 400 killed, and 75,000 people fled the region, the fighting 
threatened to overturn the peace agreement and threatened the new democratic government. 
Many were worried the fighting would result in genocide. After this, the EU voted to send in 
troops to provide relief.    
There were many problems in the eastern country after the peace agreement was reached. 
Three of the main problems were 1. Militias were continuing to operate in the region and splinter 
even though they had agreed to lay down their arms 2. There was no national army that could 
defend the country from internal or external threats, and 3. there was no nationalized police force 
to defend civilians and enforce law and order.10 There were many civil and human rights 
violations that occurred during and after the fighting. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s countless 
rebel groups and the Congolese army (FARDC) committed numerous and widespread violations 
of the laws of war against civilians. The years of sustained violence had created an enormous 
refugee crisis. Not only was the violence in the DRC creating a refugee crisis there, but refugees 
from neighboring countries (such as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola) were also fleeing to 
the DRC.9 This prolonged violence experienced by the region has led to lawless and distrust in 
institutional authorities.  
On top of the ongoing conflict there are significant humanitarian and public health issues 
facing the DRC. Between October 2017 and September 2019 there were 5.01 million internally 
displaced persons in this region.14 During April 2019 alone more than 100,000 people fled their 
homes in the North Kivu province due to insecurity.14 This insecurity was created by fighting 
around Kamango near the town of Beni and the Congolese Army fighting Mai-Mai armed groups 
in Lubero Territory. North Kivu province in the DRC remains one of the most conflict ridden, 
and displacement affected regions in the country. It has experienced the highest number of 
reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence in the country and is now experiencing 
the second largest outbreak of EVD in history.14,15   
Attacks on Health Care  
 Attacks by armed actors on aspects of health care are not a phenomenon that is new to 
this outbreak. Recently, we have witnessed widespread attacks on health care facilities and 
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personnel during the Syrian and Yemen conflicts; however, this violence targeting health care 
responses can be traced as far back as the Bosnia and Herzegovina war (1992-1995). Even 
though attacks on health care can be traced back to at least 1992 it appears that these attacks have 
become more frequent during the Syria and Yemen conflicts.16 An example of the type of 
violence towards health care seen during the Syrian civil war are target attacks by the Russian 
government and the Syrian Government on hospitals in rebel-controlled territory.17 Even though 
these attacks have been denied by both the Assad Regime and Russia, there was no denying that 
these attacks were intentional, organized, and used major weaponry such as air-to-surface 
missiles, cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and incendiaries which may be difficult for other 
groups to obtain.  
 Compared to the attacks on health care during the Syrian and Yemen wars the attacks in 
the DRC appear to different. The attacks on health care in the DRC appear to be perpetrated by a 
mixture of local militias, structured rebel groups, and community members who do not trust the 
Ebola response efforts. This mixture of actors involved in the violence towards health care 
workers can make this a more difficult problem to solve. The violence that is targeted towards 
health care here range from setting fire to Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs) during an armed 
attack, murdering a WHO epidemiologist, to psychological threats of violence to health care 
staff.18,19 However, violence towards health care in the DRC is similar to some violence targeted 
towards health care staff during the 2014-2016 EVD outbreak in West Africa.  
In 2015 the World Health Organization (WHO) establish a surveillance system for 
attacks on health care under the Attacks on Health Care Initiative (AHC). The mission of this 
surveillance system is to systematically collect information on attacks against health care across 
the globe, as well as the attack’s immediate impact on health care in countries facing 
emergencies, and to make this data available for use. The surveillance system also routinely 
publishes reported on data tends and analysis and makes this information publicly available. The 
WHO defines an attack against health care as “any act of verbal or physical violence, or 
obstruction that interferes with the availability, access and delivery of curative and/or 
preventative health services.” (WHO SSA, p. 7).20,21 The SSA is publicly available; however, the 
information for the attacks in each country do not contain location specific information, it is only 
country wide. The information also does not include any specifics about who perpetrated the 
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violent attack, or the specific name of the resource affected such as the name of the health care 
facility.  
Social Resistance to the Ebola Response efforts 
 Since the declaration of the Ebola outbreak in the eastern DRC on August 1, 2018, it has 
been fraught with resistance and violence from the community and other armed actors. This 
region of the DRC has experienced prolonged civil unrest and humanitarian crises. Several 
researchers during this outbreak have sought to explain why there is so much social resistance to 
the EVD outbreak response. Vinick. Pham, Bindu, and Bedford, sought to explore the 
association between institutional trust and the adoption of preventative measures and whether 
belief in misinformation related to EVD is associated with a lack of willingness to adopt 
preventative measures.22 Researchers conducted a population-based survey one month after the 
outbreak was declared. The survey took place in two cities that were affected by the outbreak 
Beni and Butembo. Researchers found that overall, there was a lack of trust in administrative 
leaders with the most trust in local leaders, and then decreasing amounts of trust in city, 
provincial, to national leaders. Most participants had heard some form of misinformation related 
to the EVD response such as Ebola does not exist (86.5%), Ebola is fabricated for financial gains 
(84.7%), Ebola is fabricated to destabilize the region (86.1%). One-fourth of respondents 
believed in the statement that Ebola does not exist (25.5%), 32.6% believed that it was fabricated 
for financial gain, and 36.4% believed it was fabricated to destabilize the region. However, most 
participants reported that they would seek some sort of formal care if they believed they had 
contacted EVD instead of informal care. In conclusion, researchers reported that the adherence to 
preventative measures was high, highlighting the importance of the mass communication 
campaigns initiated at the beginning of the outbreak. Researchers also highlighted that their 
study reinforces the importance of community trust and that the best way to ensure the 
community trusts the response efforts is to make sure that there is community buy-in and 
community engagement.  
 Masumbuko Claude and colleagues also conducted a similar study to examine the social 
resistance to EVD control efforts during the outbreak in the eastern DRC.8 They conducted a 
mixed methods study using focus group discussions (FGDs) and a 18 item survey questionnaire. 
The participants in the FDGs were selected from a convenience sample of people living in the 
regions affected by the outbreak, participants were 18 years or older, and the FDGs were 
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conducted during the fourth month of the epidemic. The questionnaire was developed using past 
questionnaires that were used in Guinea and the DRC and were also informed by the results from 
the FGDs. The survey participants were also selected from a convenience sample, participants 
were selected by the surveyors, who were leaders among medial students at a local university in 
Butembo. The questionnaire collected participant demographic information as well as several 
key domains related to social resistance to EVD control efforts. These domains were: perceived 
risk of EVD, denial of biomedical discourse, dissatisfaction and mistrust of EVD response team, 
vaccine acceptability and community engagement, support for incidents of overt hostility, and 
intentions to comply with control efforts in case of EVD illness or death in family. Researchers 
concluded that their survey results suggested that a substantial minority of respondents supported 
views suggestive of resistance, and that resistance was associated with denial of the biomedical 
discourse and dissatisfaction/mistrust of the EVD response team. And that this mistrust and 
resistance many lead to a decreased willingness to comply with EVD control efforts such as 
isolation and vaccination.   
 This, however, is not the first Ebola outbreak to encounter social resistance. During the 
2013-2016 EVD outbreak in west Africa there was increased social resistance to EVD response 
efforts in Guinea compared to Sierra Leone.23 Researchers noted that even though Guinea and 
Sierra Leone share several cultural similarities there was stark differences in the social resistance 
to the EVD response. Researchers concluded that these differences in response to the EVD 
outbreak can be explained by their contrasting political practices and the legacies that French 
direct rile and British indirect rule made on the countries.  
 Social resistance to outbreak response activities is not something new. In an article by 
Cohn and Kutalek researchers examined the parallels between Cholera epidemics in Europe 
during the 19th century and the EVD outbreak in West Africa.24 They cite the lack of community 
trust and failures in communication, lack of engagement with local communities, adverse 
publicity, and stained relationships between local populations, governmental authorities, and 
outside agencies as drivers for violence in the present and in the past. The summary of articles 






Table 1. Summary of literature review for attacks on health care during the Ebola outbreak in the 
DRC from August 2018 – January 2020 
Author(s) Year  Location Important Points or Findings 
Afzal & Jafar 2019 Multiple 
Countries  
-Researchers aimed to explore what is known of the 
impacts of attacks on health care  
Briody et al.  2018 Multiple 
Countries  
-Researchers sought to identify if the number of 
attacks targeting health care in Syria and Yemen were 
more frequent than in past conflicts  
-They examined conflicts in six middle- and high-
income countries over the past 30 years 
-Researchers concluded that the number of facilities 
attacked was the highest in Syria suggesting that these 




2017 Syria -Overview of attacks on health care in Syria during the 






-Community mistrust to EVD outbreak is not a new 
phenomenon 
-Community mistrust in countries affected by EVD 
outbreak mirror mistrust in Europe of Cholera from 
1830 – 20th century  
Dobbins, et al.  2008 Multiple 
Countries; 
DRC 
-Exploration of the history of European intervention in 
the DRC since the civil war in 1997 
-Researchers look at some of the precursors of war and 
challenges that are faced today in a post-conflict DRC 
Masumbuko 
Claude et al.   
2019 DRC -Researchers explored social resistance to EVD 
control measures implemented during the 2018-2019 
EVD outbreak in the Eastern DRC 
-Qualitative data was collected through focus group 
discussion. Quantitative data was collected through 
survey. 
- Significant proportion of those surveyed backed 
views suggestive of resistance, and that this was 
associated with mistrust of EVD response 
-Resistance to response may provide opportunity for 
continuing transmission of EVD 
Vinck et al.  2019 DRC -Researchers wanted to gain a better understanding on 
if institutional trust is associated with the adoption of 
preventative measures and whether belief in EVD 
misinformation is associated with lower adoption of 
EVD preventative measures  
-One in four respondents believed in the statement 
Ebola does not exist, a higher proportion believed that 
the outbreak was fabricated for financial gains or to 
destabilize the region 
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- Low levels of trust in government institutions and 
widespread belief in misinformation  
-Local authorities were more trusted than city, 
provincial, or national authorities 
-Researchers concluded that low institutional trust and 
belief in misinformation are indicators or a low 






-When the epidemic hit the chiefs in Sierra Leone had 
legitimacy that the leaders in Guinea did not have and 
they were better able to facilitate trust between the 
community and international humanitarian 
organizations 
-The differences in French direct rule and British in-
direct rule may be a contributing factor as to why 
Guinea had more instances of over resistance 
compared to Sierra Leone  
Stearns 2012 DRC; 
North Kivu 
Province 
-Prolonged violence experienced in the region since 
liberation in 1960  
-There has been long standing conflict between ethnic 
groups such as those who consider themselves 
“indigenous,” and Hutu and Tutsi immigrants from 
Rwanda 
-Armed actors in the region have been backed by local 




 EVD is zoonotic with frequent spillovers into humans, non-human primates, and other 
animal populations. There is evidence to support the claim that the natural host for EVD is bats, 
particularly bats belonging to the Pteropodidae family; however, there has yet to be virus isolated 
from bats found in natural conditions.2 Humans are likely infected by coming into close contact 
with bats or other deceased animals such as chimpanzees or other wild game. After the initial 
spillover event, the disease can be spread by human-to-human transmission via bodily fluids. 
Caring for those who are sick or coming into close contact with dead bodies is associated with a 
high risk for disease transmission because of the likelihood of coming into direct contact with 
bodily fluids.2 Because bodily fluids are very infectious, the risk of nosocomial transmission is 
very high; therefore, it is essential that appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) be used 
when treating EVD patients. The incubation period is 2-21 days, and there are three phases of the 
disease. Phase one is defined by an acute non-specific viral illness where patients will experience 
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symptoms such as malaise, fatigue, and body aches.2,3 During the second phase of the disease is 
dominated by gastrointestinal symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, at this stage 
many patients will become dehydrated.2,3  After the second week of illness, some patients will 
begin to recover; however some will begin to deteriorate among those who do not recover, 
patients will proceed to the third stage, which is shock possibly due to hypovolaemia and a 
systemic inflammatory response, some patients may also experience neurological manifestations 
during this stage.2,3 At this point, some patients will begin to experience hemorrhage; however, 
during the 2013-2016 West Africa outbreak, this wasn’t common.2 Many other common diseases 
can have similar symptoms as EVD such as influenza, malaria, or typhoid fever.4  
On July 28, 2018 a notification was sent from the North Kivu Provincial Health division to 
the Ministry of Health in the Democratic Republic of Congo detailing a cluster of acute 
hemorrhagic fever cases.5  On August 1, 2018 the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale 
(INRB) in Kinshasa reported that of the six samples that were collected from the patients who 
were hospitalized Mabalako Health Zone in North Kivu, four tested positive for EVD.5 This 
marked the beginning of the 10th outbreak of EVD in the DRC since it’s discovery in 1976. The 
outbreak in the North Kivu Province was officially declared on August 1, 2018 one week after 
the 9th outbreak in the Équateur province was declared as ending.  
There are several reasons why the outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces is unique. One 
being that North Kivu province is one of the most populous provinces in the DRC with 8 million 
inhabitants and shares a border with not only four other provinces in the DRC (Ituri, South Kivu, 
Maniema, and Tshopo) but it also shares a border with Uganda and Rwanda.6 Second being that 
this outbreak is occurring in a conflict zone. The eastern region of the DRC has experienced 
sustained violence since the 1960s when the DRC gained its independence from Belgium. There 
were at least 40 armed groups active in the eastern DRC as of October 2013.7 Due to the 
prolonged and sustained violence there is an atmosphere of mistrust among communities of the 
Ebola response efforts.8 This mistrust and suspicion have fueled the violence in the region. Due 
to this violence there are an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons in the region and a 
continuous exodus of refugees to neighboring countries such as Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.6 
Third, not only is the region experiencing an EVD outbreak it is also co-currently experiencing 
cholera, monkeypox, and vaccine-derived polio virus type 2 outbreaks.9  
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The purpose of this study is to have a better understanding of how this violence towards 
health care services has impacted the country’s ability to contain this outbreak. It is important to 
understand how often these attacks are happening, what resources are they affecting, and when 
these attacks reached their peak. The intent of this thesis is to quantify the frequency of attacks 
on health care sourced from publicly available data to have a better understanding of the 




 This study was a cross-sectional examination of data collected via multiple publicly 
available resources.  
Data Sources 
 The data was obtained from several publicly available resources and then matched to 
incidents reported in the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA) provided 
publicly by the World Health Organization (WHO). Incidents were matched based on the date of 
the incident, time the incident occurred, affected resources, and any injuries/deaths. Sources used 
to gather incidents can be broken down into five categories listed below. If incidents were unable 
to be matched to an incident reported in the SSA, they were still included in the data set if they 
affected any aspect of the EVD response. Figure 1. Displays the dataset creation process and 
Table 2. Displays the breakdown of sources used. 
 Search Process and Dataset Creation Process 
 The search process for data began by pulling data from the WHO SSA. Next a review of 
all publicly published DRC Ministry of Health (MoH) reports since the declaration of the 
outbreak in August 2018. The MoH published reports on the EVD outbreak from August 2018 – 
July 20, 2019 when the Ebola response efforts were handed over to the office of the President of 
the DRC. After this, a detailed review was also conducted of Helen Branswell’s twitter feed for 
Ebola related tweets from August 2018 – January 2020. An extensive search for Ebola Related 
Articles took place on three local media outlets websites: Actulite.CD, Radio Moto, and Afrique 
la libre, news articles were translated from French to English using google translate. Data was 
also extracted from Kivu Security Project that was accessed multiple times from August 2019 – 
February 2020. Data was also extracted from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
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Project; data was pulled during the month of January 2020.25 Insecurity Insight’s attacks on 
Ebola Response Monthly News Briefs were also reviewed from August 2018 – January 2020.25-
39 A search was also done on ProMed-Mail for Ebola related entries from August 2018 – January 
2020. All external WHO situation reports published from August 2018 – January 2020 were 
reviewed, as were Weekly Bulletin’s on Outbreaks and Other Emergencies published by the 
WHO Africa Office. A search was also done for all EVD related articles published by CIDRAP 
from August 2018 – January 2020.  
Table 2. Summary of data sources used for dataset creation  
Type Sources 
International and national news  -Actualite.CD 
-Radio Moto 
-Afrique la libre 
Non-profit organizations  -Kivu Security Project 
-The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED) 
-Insecurity Insight  
-ProMed-Mail 
Public health organizations -WHO Situation Reports 
-Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and Other 
Emergencies, WHO Africa Office 
-DRC Ministry of Health  
Social Media -STAT news contributor Helen Branswell’s 
twitter feed 
Universities  -University of Minnesota, Center for 
Infectious Disease Research and Policy 
(CIDRAP) 
Variables  
For this analysis there were four main variables of interest: date, province, affected health 
care resource, and perpetrator of attack. Date of the incident was assigned as the date in which 
the attack took place. If the attack took place overnight and lasted into the next day, the date in 
which the attack began was used as the date of the attack. Province was assigned according to 
which province the attack took place in.  
Affected health care resource was a variable assigned by the SSA. For attacks that could 
be matched to attacks in the SSA, the affected health care resource for that assigned attack was 
used. If the attack could not be matched to any attack that was recorded in the SSA, that attack 
was still included in the data set and was assigned an affected health care resource based on the 
description of the attack. For example, if looters stole supplies and set on fire a treatment center 
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it was assigned the health care facilities affected health care resource. If there was no mention of 
health care personnel directly being impacted by the event, they were not included in the affected 
health care resource.  
Perpetrators of attacks on healthcare were broken up into six groups which were defined 
as: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Community Members, Mai-Mai Militia, and Unknown 
Perpetrators. Attacker identity was assigned according to the details provided by the source of 
the information. If the source indicated ADF was behind the attack, ADF was, therefore, 
identified as the attacker. If any Mai-Mai Militia was responsible for an attack they were grouped 
as Mai-Mai Militia. Because of the amount of different Mai-Mai Militias in the region they were 
all grouped together for simplicity. If there was indication that the perpetrators of the attack were 
family members of an EVD victim, or just general community members that attack was assigned 
to the Community Members group. If the group was classified as unknown in the source details 
the attacker was classified as unknown. This is because based on the information available the 
perpetrator cannot be classified as belonging to a group. Unknown perpetrators could be armed 
or unarmed groups.  
Statistical Methods 
 Microsoft Excel was used to create the data set, organize data and create graphs. SAS 9.4 
was used for performing statistical analysis.  
Results 
 There were 425 attacks on healthcare reported to the WHO SSA in the DRC from August 
2018 – January 2020. Of those 425 attacks on health care 65 (15.29%) were suspected to have 
been towards the EVD response. Outside of accounts reported to the WHO SSA an additional 37 
attacks were added to this dataset for a total of 102 attacks on health care. These attacks were 
focused on the EVD response and could not be assigned to any reports in the SSA. North Kivu 
province experienced the most attacks with 80 (78.43%) attacks, Ituri had 22 (21.57%) attacks. 
Between August 1, 2018 and January 31, 2020 there were an average of 1.26 attacks per week 
(SD 1.55, median 1), and an average of 5.67 attacks per month (SD 3.58, median 6). For the 12 
months that had reported attacks between August 2018 – January 2020, there was an average 
18.60% increase in attacks each month Table. 3 shows the percent increase or decrease in 
reported incidents for each month, as well as the number of reported cases each month.  
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The peak of violent attacks occurred in May 2019 with 14 attacks being confirmed during 
that month, followed by February 2019 with 10 attacks confirmed during that month. For Ituri 
Province there was two peaks of violent attacks, the first peak was in June 2019, 4 (18.18%), the 
second was in October 2019, 4 (18.18%). For North Kivu Province the peak occurred during 
May 2019, 13 (16.25%) attacks. The peak of attacks per week for both provinces was during 
week 42 (October 14 – 20, 2019), with 7 (6.86%) attacks. For Ituri Province the violent attacks 
peaked during week 42 (14 – 20 October 2019) with 4 (18.18%) attacks. For North Kivu 
Province there were two weeks, the first week was week 9 (February 25 – March 3, 2019) with 5 
(6.25%) attacks, the next peak was during week 52 (December 23 – 29, 2019) with 5 (6.25%) 
attacks as well.  
There were several different attackers that were noted as perpetrators of this violence 
during this outbreak and they were broken down into six groups which are: Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF), Community Members, Mai-Mai Militia, and Unknown Perpetrators. The main 
force behind the violent attacks for both provinces was the Unknown Perpetrators Group with 39 
(38.24%) attacks. However, the main force behind attacks in Ituri province was both the general 
population with 8 (36.36%), and Mai-Mai Militia 8 (36.36%) compared to North Kivu Province, 
where the main force behind attacks was overwhelmingly the Unknown Perpetrator Group 34 
(42.50). The entire breakdown of perpetrators of violence can be found in Table 4. There was no 
evidence of violent attacks towards the EVD response in South Kivu province from August 2018 
– January 2020. Figures 1 – 3 show the distribution of attacks against health care and EVD cases 
by date of illness onset for August 2018 – January 2020. 
 There were several resources that were impacted by attacks on health care. In each attack 
more than one resource could be affected. The frequency of all affected resources is displayed in 
Table 5. The three most affected resources were health care facilities 56 (37.09%), followed by 
health care personnel 50 (33.12%), and health care transport 17 (11.26%).   
Out of 102 confirmed incidents there were 15 reported deaths, 31 reported injuries (one 
injury occurred among a healthcare worker’s spouse), 22 abductions (4 of these abductions were 
of patients). Ituri province accounted for 4 (26.67%) deaths, while North Kivu province had 11 
(73.33%) deaths. Ituri province accounted for 11 (35.48%) injuries, while North Kivu province 
accounted for 20 (64.52%) injuries, including one civilian injury.  
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 To assess how long EVD response operations were delayed after major attacks on health 
care, all the above sources were used to identify times in which some aspect of the response 
stopped. Because the response efforts are so complex and multi-faceted, any event that impacted 
any aspect of the response was counted. If there was no date mentioned in which response efforts 
resumed it was assumed that the response was impacted one day only. All together the response 
was halted for 103 days between August 2018 – January 2020.  
Discussion 
 The amount of attacks against health care services in the DRC during this EVD outbreak 
has had a substantial impact on bringing this outbreak to an end. In a study by Wells and 
colleagues, researchers attempted to evaluate the spatial dynamics of Ebola transmission and to 
quantify the impact of vaccination on the Ebola outbreak in Équateur province DRC. 
Researchers concluded that the ring vaccination helped bring the outbreak under control.40 Wells 
and colleagues stated that if the vaccination campaign had been delayed by one week, the 
reduction in risk in the area where the outbreak occurred would have dropped from a 70.4% 
reduction to 33.3% reduction.40 The study conducted by Wells and colleagues highlights the 
importance of being able to implement vaccine campaigns in an appropriate amount of time to 
reduce the risk of EVD. During the outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri provinces the same vaccine 
was used as in the Équateur province outbreak, recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus (rVSV)-
vectored vaccine for Ebola Virus Disease (rVSV-ZEBOV).40 However, even though the same 
vaccine and vaccination strategy, ring vaccination, were used this outbreak has lasted 
substantially longer than the Équateur province outbreak and has lead to more cases and deaths.  
There were several instances during the North Kivu and Ituri province of the EVD 
response being halted because of attacks. This halt of the response efforts resulted in some 
aspects of the response being put on hold, and in some circumstances, vaccination of contact 
(ring vaccination) was put on hold. Altogether, there were 103 days of delayed response efforts. 
Time and time again, in the MoH reports, and in the WHO reports, there has been a commentary 
on community reluctance – specifically reluctance of contacts to get vaccinated, and sometimes 
this reluctance has resulted in violence.24 There were also numerous examples of violence toward 
safe and dignified burial teams. Safe and dignified burials are essential to stop the spread of EVD 
because the body is so contagious after death.24-39   
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  Not only were the response efforts severely delayed it was clear that health care facilities 
were also significantly impacted with 37.09% of all affected resources being health care 
facilities. It is essential that during an Ebola outbreak patients’ have adequate access health care 
facilities to reduce the amount of community spread. It is also important to note that the peak 
month, and the peak week varied when comparing Ituri and North Kivu provinces, and the 
amount of deaths, abductions, and injuries were greater in North Kivu province than in Ituri 
province.  
Limitations 
 This study has several limitations. One limitation is that there is no way that there can be 
absolute certainty that an attack that was matched to an incident in the WHO’s Surveillance 
System for Attacks on Health care is in fact that incident. The WHO only provides country level 
information on each incident; therefore, there is no way to be certain that an event reported in the 
surveillance system happened to the EVD response teams in the eastern part of the country.  
Second limitation is that even though 102 attacks were identified, there is likely to be 
more attacks than reported here. Numerous attacks against health care personnel were recorded 
in the WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on health care as psychological threats of 
violence. It is very rare to see any sort of threat or intimidation reported on in the sources used to 
gather information. There were mentions of threats against health care workers but not specific 
incidents, therefore, the estimates made here are likely to be an underestimation of the actual 
magnitude of violence towards health care during this outbreak.  
Third, there were several assumptions made here during this analysis and they will surely 
have a significant impact on the results shown here. One of the assumptions made during the 
attempt to assess the impact that major violent events had one the EVD response was that if there 
was not a date that could be found in which response operations resumed it was assumed that the 
response was only delayed for one day. This is likely an underestimation of the impact of attacks 
on the response.  
Conclusion 
While the outbreak currently appears to be coming to an end, this EVD outbreak has 
shown that the world is underprepared for an outbreak of such a virulent disease in an area 
experiencing active conflict. It also demonstrates that even though there have been massive 
efforts to educate the public on the lethality of EVD and the importance of seeking prompt care, 
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there is still some reluctance in the population to seek care. This reluctance can result in violence 
towards health care workers participating in the response efforts. Violence that targets response 
efforts hampers the ability to contain the outbreak.  
Our study, one of the first, to demonstrate the prevalence and context of violent attacks 
related to health care resources and delivery during a health crisis indicate need for deliberate 
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Figure 2. EVD incidence by week of illness onset and number of attacks on healthcare by week 










































Figure 3. EVD incidence by week of illness onset in North Kivu Province and attacks on health 






Figure 4. EVD incidence by week of illness onset in Ituri Province and attacks on health care in 

















































































Table 3. Number of attacks on health care by province, month and year and percent change in 

























Year Month Ituri North Kivu 
2018 
August 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) - 
September 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) - 
October 0 (0.00) 2 (1.96) 2 (1.96) - 
November 0 (0.00) 3 (2.94) 3 (2.94) +50.00 
December 0 (0.00) 4 (3.92) 4 (3.92) +33.33 
2019 
January 2 (1.96) 1 (0.98) 3 (2.94) -25.00 
February 1 (0.98) 9 (8.82) 10 (9.80) +233.33 
March 0 (0.00) 6 (5.88) 6 (5.88) -40.00 
April 1 (0.98) 6 (5.88) 7 (6.86) +16.67 
May 1 (0.98) 13 (12.75) 14 (13.73) +100.00 
June 4 (3.92) 3 (2.94) 7 (6.86) -41.18 
July 0 (0.00) 5 (4.90) 5 (4.90) -28.57 
August 1 (0.98) 6 (5.88) 7 (6.86) +40.00 
September 2 (1.96) 6 (5.88) 8 (7.84) +14.29 
October 4 (3.92) 5 (4.90) 9 (8.82) +12.50 
November 3 (2.94) 5 (4.90) 8 (7.84) -11.11 
December 2 (1.96) 4 (3.92) 6 (5.88) -25.00 
2020 January 1 (0.98) 2 (1.96) 3 (2.94) -50.00 









(N) (%) Ituri North Kivu 
Allied Democratic Forces 1 (0.98) 5 (4.90) 6 (5.88) 
Community Members 8 (7.94) 22 (21.57) 30 (29.41) 
Mai Mai Militia  8 (7.92) 19 (18.63) 27 (26.47) 
Unknown Perpetrators  5 (4.90) 34 (33.33) 39 (38.24) 
Total  22 (21.57) 80 (78.43) 102 (100) 
 
 





(N) (%) Ituri North Kivu 
Health care facilities  14 (9.15) 46 (30.07) 60 (39.22) 
Health care personnel 13 (8.50) 40 (26.14) 53 (34.64) 
Health care transport  4 (2.61) 15 (9.80) 19 (12.42) 
Health care supplies/assets 6 (3.92) 11 (7.19) 17 (11.11) 
Health care warehouse/storage 0 (0.00) 1 (0.65) 1 (0.65) 
Health care patients  1 (0.65) 2 (1.31) 3 (1.96) 
Total  38 (24.84) 115 (75.16) 153 (100.00) 
*More than one health care resource can be impacted during every attack 
 
 
